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Abstract
While mobile platforms rely on developers to follow good
practices in privacy design, developers might not always
adhere. In addition, it is often difficult for users to under-
stand the privacy behaviour of their applications without
some prolonged usage. To aid in these issues, we describe
on-going research to improve privacy protection by utilizing
techniques that mine privacy information from application
binaries as a grey-box (Automated Privacy Checking). The
outputs can then be utilized to improve the user’s ability to
exercise privacy-motivated discretion. We conducted a user
study to observe the effects of presenting information on
leak-causing triggers within applications in the form of pri-
vacy message overlays. We found that while users’ prior
usage time largely determined their usage behaviour, pre-
senting trigger information helped users who disapproved
with data use and had sufficient understanding of the impli-
cations of data leaks. Users’ inherent level of privacy con-
sciousness and surprise levels were also factors in ensur-
ing the effectiveness of messages.
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Introduction
Mobile application privacy research has received a lot of
attention in recent years. Mobile applications can gather
too much about the user that he or she may be uncomfort-
able with sharing, or may be unnecessary for the utility of
the application. The problem is being tackled is a few main
areas, for example in research that empirically finds more
about users’ privacy usage behaviours [4, 12], designing
HCI interfaces that makes it easier for users to configure
and make decisions [3, 2], as well as in engineering sys-
tems for detection and access-control of applications’ usage
of privacy data [5, 13].
Advantages in Forensics
Privacy Checking
(i) Lower CPU Over-
heads/Improved User-
Friendliness: CPU over-
heads reduced because leak
detectors are utilized on au-
tomated app testers in the
back-end, and results passed
to users.
(ii) Improved Flexibility
of Notifications: Provides
information on privacy ’leak-
causes’, as well as bet-
ter tailoring of notification
mechanisms due to prior
knowledge of data-access
characteristics.
(iii) Improve Privacy Poli-
cies set by User and/or
App Developer: Automated
characterization of apps
allows for formulation of
pre-deployment strategies
that can complement privacy
design.
(iv) Overcome Limitation
of Individual Tools: Frame-
work allows for combination
of complementary leak de-
tectors.
(v) Ease in Set-up: Does not
require phone modifications
on user-side.
While tools have been created by platform developers as
well as by the research community [8, 13], inherent draw-
backs exist in terms of: (i) Significant CPU overheads re-
quired for privacy detection, ( [13] evaluated that detection
overheads on CPU can be up to 35% over baseline), (ii)
Notifications have limited flexibility due to run-time nature;
Notifications that informs users ’when’ but not ’how’ pri-
vacy leaks occur,(iii) Incorrect privacy policies set by the
User (Inexperience or lack of knowledge) and/or App Devel-
oper (Undesirable privacy design practices), (iv) Limitations
of individual detection tools that could complement each
other (e.g. Ap-Ops/PMP [8, 1] detects data access but not
HTTP leaks, TaintDroid [5] detects HTTP leaks but not im-
plicit data flows in applications), as well as (v) Difficulties
in set-up. (Most tools require customized phone images or
modifications to the operating system)
To alleviate these drawbacks, we introduced a Mobile
App Forensics Privacy Checking Framework in the Back-
end [9, 7]. The framework advocates a similar philosophy
of malware detection systems in application stores (Such as
the Android and Apple store Bouncers that vet apps prior
to publishing [11, 6]), where privacy behaviours and leak-
causes of applications are tested in the back-end on testing
devices using dynamic/static analysis techniques. The re-
sults of such testing can then be utilized in a lightweight
client for notification.
Advantages in Forensics Privacy Checking
Automated Forensics Privacy Checking utilizes back-end
testing of applications, in contrast to currently available
tools which detect application data-access in real-time
during application usage. It has advantages as it allows
the creation of a taxonomy of privacy leak-causes and
characterization of applications (e.g. Does the app leak
data on start-up? In a periodic fashion? What are culprit
buttons/widgets?), even before they are installed on user
phones. Notification is then performed with a customized
Android app from a ’leak-cause’ database.
(Please see left Side-Bar) CPU Overheads are lowered
because leak detectors do not actually run on user de-
vices, but are utilized on automated app testers running
in the back-end. Lower CPU Overheads in turn improve
user-friendliness due to better UI responsiveness. Privacy
Checking also improves the Flexibility of Notifications be-
cause it allows for pre-deployment tailoring of message ap-
pearances, depending on the leak characteristics of the
app. For example, if it is known that privacy data is leaked
in a periodic fashion, a single notification message can be
made indicating this, or providing the user with a prior-use
choice of control. Instead of having to constantly notify the
user and letting him/her discover the characteristic over
time, which has privacy costs. Information on user-triggered
’leak-causes’ are also available, which can indicate to users
data accessed from clicking certain buttons in the app.
Privacy checking can also potentially improve privacy poli-
cies set by users by aiding them in making decisions in the
configuration of privacy profiles. An example is that auto-
generated summaries might be produced on the type of
app vs. its privacy behaviours. Privacy checking frame-
work also allows for the combination of leak-detection tools,
which can help to overcome the individual limitations of
each of these tools. For example, the TaintDroid detec-
tor [5] flags data-leaks but is unable to detect implicit leaks
or leaks by 3rd-party native libraries. Ap-Ops/PMP [8, 1]
covers a blind-spot in data-access detection on 3rd-party
native libraries.
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Figure 1: Utilizing outputs of
privacy checking - Privacy
Messages overlaid on-top of culprit
buttons/widgets during Application
Usage, providing information that
the particular application page is
involved with access of the user’s
Phone Identifier (IMEI)
Ongoing Research Work: We implemented an automated
app testing system that utilizes Automated Model Check-
ing [10], and parallelizes test instances over multiple test
devices and emulators. Test apps are traversed automati-
cally by triggering user-actions that cause app transitions.
Using privacy leak detectors and app-usage layout logs, we
mine and infer privacy characteristics of apps (Periodicity
of data-leaks; Leak-causing Widgets/Views). Testing times
ranged from a few minutes to 4-5 hours depending on the
structure of the app. Due to the high testing times required,
it became evident that an exhaustive exploration would not
be a practical strategy. We thus utilized Directed Testing
from the Control Flow Graph (CFG) obtained from static
analysis of apps to prune the search. By identifying the UI
components that are linked to data-access API calls, we
directed app testing towards the app areas that are linked
to privacy data accesses. We found that this approach can
reduce testing times significantly.
Deployment Hurdles in Playstores: App-stores face an
increase in processing time and effort. Additional resources
are also required for storage and delivery of results. As pri-
vacy is usually viewed as a secondary concern, as com-
pared to malware or virus detection, this also might discour-
age app-stores from increasing resources towards privacy
checking.
Utilizing Outputs as Notification of ’Leak-Causes’
The outputs of our privacy checking were apps’ data-leak
characteristics (such as whether app leaked data on Start-
Ups; or in Periodic manner), as well as the buttons/widgets
on specific app layouts that leaked when clicked upon.
There are many possible ways to utilize these outputs; For
e.g., as additional summaries in configurable permission
manager lists, notification scroll-downs or pop-up mes-
sages. We chose to utilize outputs as privacy message
summaries that appear to users on app start-up, as well
as by overlaying messages directly on-top of leak-causing
buttons/widgets. (Figure. 1 shows an example of a privacy
overlay). The privacy messages appeared when the user
reaches targeted in-app views/layouts containing the in-
volved buttons. We conducted a 2-week Field Study, to
evaluate the effects of privacy messages on real users.
2-Week Field Study
The field study had 47 users, who were randomly divided
into separate groups of Test (With Messages), and Control
(Without Messages). (25 Users in Test, 22 Users in Con-
trol) They consisted of staff/students as well as external
working adults. We utilized 10 test apps that many of the
users had already been using regularly (Social Media, Util-
ity, News as well as Game Apps). We captured the charac-
teristics of users from pre and post-study surveys on 7-point
Likert-Scale as well as Yes/No questions. These charac-
teristics include users’ Prior app Usage-time (Familiarity),
Surprise level, Usability, Privacy Consciousness level and
Disapproval of app data-usage. In addition to privacy mes-
sages, a subset of 17 users were provided with a stimulus
of additional User Education on the meaning of messages
(e.g. IMEI were identifiers that could allow tracking etc.)
as well as implications of allowing accesses (private data
could be sent over the network and stored by developers).
We conducted a multiple regression with characteristics
as Independent variables, and the Duration of App Usage
(Log) and No. of Leak Buttons Clicked (Log) as Dependent
variables (Table. 1). We investigated these Dependent vari-
ables as they were proportional to the amount of privacy
data being leaked by the application.
From Table. 1, we found that users’ Prior App Usage Time
(Familiarity) was the dominant individual factor in affect-
ing the Duration of App Usage, while User Education was
significant in reducing the No. of Leak Buttons that users
clicked. There were significant 3-factor interactions, which
indicated that the Privacy Messages were effective for
users who Disapproved of the data use and had appropri-
ate User Education, professed high Privacy Consciousness
levels or were Surprised with the data accesses.
Discussion & Implications of Findings
Our notifications can be described as ’Non-Enforcing’, in
which messages appear to the user in the background. This
is in contrast to ’Enforcing’ mechanisms, in which message
controls appear with a GUI freeze, where the user is re-
quired to make a selection on the data access before app
functionality can be restored. Our study highlights the con-
ditions under which a ’Non-Enforcing’ mechanism can be
effective. In particular, we uncovered that user-disapproval
with accesses, user-education, inherent levels of privacy
consciousness as well as high surprise-levels play a part in
effectiveness. For strong overall effects, especially for users
who have a longer history of usage of the particular app as
well as in warning of more serious issues such as malware,
’Enforcing’ mechanisms would be advocated.
Depend. Independ. Est. Std. p-val
Variable Variable Error
Duration (1) Privacy -0.13 0.83 0.88
of Messages (0.04) (1.73) (0.98)
App
Usage (2) Disapp -0.01 0.18 0.95
(Log) -roval of (-2.52) (1.61) (0.12)
Data Use
(No. of
Leak (3) User 0.02 0.17 0.90
Buttons Education (-0.83) (0.47) (0.08*)
Clicked
(Log)) (4) Privacy 0.12 0.12 0.33
Conscious- (-0.09) (0.31) (0.76)
ness
(5) Surprise 0.04 0.04 0.31
Level (-0.03) (0.12) (0.78)
(6) Prior App 0.24 0.05 1.23×
Usage 10
−5
Time ***
(Familiarity) (0.10) (0.12) (0.40)
Interaction -1.23 0.32 1.38×
(1:2:3) 10
−4
***
(-3.83) (0.95) (7.86×
10
−5
***)
Interaction -0.28 0.12 0.021
(1:2:4) ***
(-0.19) (0.36) (0.60)
Interaction -0.15 0.08 0.07*
(1:2:5) (-0.44) (0.25) (0.08*)
Table 1: Results: Multiple Linear
Regression of Field Study
(***99%,**95%,*90% Confidence
Intervals)
An observation is that privacy messages is unlikely to cause
overall usage durations to drop, and this supports the no-
tion that mobile platforms can readily deploy privacy mes-
sages in an app without significant decrease in overall us-
age rates. Another implication is that it is greatly beneficial
for platforms to include educational aspects, as well as uti-
lize message designs that increase the contrasts between
legitimate and questionable usage for increased surprise to
users.
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